Introduction - (Based on the works of: Gen. Burnod, Paris 1827.)

Napoleon fought more battles than Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar combined. He is, beyond any doubt, the greatest of European soldiers. He never wrote his theories or principles on the conduct of war, although he often expressed the intention of doing so and remarked that everyone would be surprised at how simple they were.

Napoleon lived at a time when the possibilities of war had been increased enormously. Saxe had formed divisions in his army, consisting of two brigades of infantry and one of artillery, and had used them during an entire campaign. Marshal de Broglie had adopted a permanent divisional organization in 1759 and had concentrated his army rapidly by the assembly of these units. The divisional organization and marching in small columns of from 2000 to 4000 men, permitted rapid deployment on the battlefield, whereas the old procedures required six to eight hours to form a line of battle. Marshal de Broglie had developed the principle of dispersion with units in supporting distance, in camp and on the march, and concentration on the field of battle. Gribeauval had reduced the weight and increased the mobility of artillery so that it could maneuver with the infantry. Accurate maps were becoming general, an important matter in the handling of large forces.

The theories by which all these changes could be utilized had been expounded by Guibert, du Teil, and Bourcet. It remained for Napoleon alone, among the generals of his time, to seize all these possibilities to their full and develop from them a calculated system of strategy and a system of tactics calculated with equal brilliance. No other general of his time realized these possibilities until forced to learn by combating Napoleon.

He astounded his opponents by the crushing rapidity of his battles. He marched against the enemy and his plan of battle was a part of his plan of march. His strategical system, according to Capt. J. Colin and General Camon, were based on marching rapidly and secretly past the enemy's flank to get on the hostile line of communications. This forced his opponent to turn and fight at a disadvantage.

His tactical system, or scheme of battle, was based on a holding attack against the enemy's front to keep them occupied, a wide envelopment or turning movement on the enemy's rear with a small force to spread dismay and confusion in the defender's ranks, and then the decisive blow. This was given by a powerful attack, usually in the form of a close-in envelopment, which was prepared by concentrated fire of a mass of artillery.

Napoleon constantly added to the amount of his artillery. In 1800 he organized the horses and drivers of the artillery as part of the artillery batteries. Previous to this time the horses and drivers had been temporarily hired civilians, who hauled the guns up to the battlefield, left them there, and returned to get them after the battle was over. It is rather amusing that, even in recent days, one of the common criticisms of Napoleon has been that he increased his artillery. This was ascribed to the deterioration of his infantry in his later career. The critics overlook the fact that small-arms fire had improved and that the old offensive charge had become increasingly costly and less able to break the lines of the defenders than it had been in the past. Napoleon used his artillery in masses to break these lines, spread confusion, and prepare the way for his infantry. The result was a material saving of lives for his infantry and enhanced chance of victory.

Napoleon was the first great strategist of the western world. His battles were the result of his strategical movements and were carefully calculated. The art of strategy, as developed by writers for the past century, has its foundation in his operations. Baron Jomini was the chief expounder of Napoleon's methods. Clausewitz' great book, On War, was likewise an outgrowth of Napoleonic studies. Jomini's work was the textbook for the conduct of the American Civil War. It has been said that the Civil War was fought with Jomini in the pocket of all the higher officers. Clausewitz' influence was felt most profoundly in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and in the Ist World War.

Many collections of Napoleon's maxims and precepts have been made. The present collection is both the first and the best selection of any small collection. It was published in Paris in 1827 and almost immediately was translated into German, English, Spanish, and Italian. Stonewall Jackson carried these maxims in his haversack throughout his campaign. "This little volume," states Col. G. F. R. Henderson, Jackson's biographer, "contains a fairly complete exposition, in Napoleon's own words, of the grand principles of war."

In his introduction, General Burnod, the compiler of these maxims, states: "The art of war is susceptible of being considered under two titles: the one, which rests entirely on the knowledge and genius of the commander; the other, on matters of detail. The first is the same for all time, for all peoples, whatever the arms with which they fight. From this it follows that the same principles have directed the great captains of all centuries. The matters of detail, on the contrary, are subject to the influence of time, to the spirit of the people and the character of armaments."

The continuing interest and application of most of these maxims indicates that the original compiler succeeded in selecting Napoleon's most pertinent aphorisms of permanent value.